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This page is the very beginning of a work to organize the Epicurean arguments. The texts will be drawn from the following translations: On The Nature of the Gods (Yonge), On Divination (Yonge), On Fate (Yonge), On Ends (Rackham), Academic Questions (Rackham), On Duties (Miller), Tusculun Disputations (Yonge).
1. The Anti-Epicurean Worldview As Summarized By Cicero: An Outline With Epicurean Responses 1.1. “On The Nature of the Gods” In this book Cicero summarizes the arguments for and against the existence of “gods,” and also addresses the nature of those gods and what influence they have, if any, on humanity. Velleius presents the Epicurean position, Lucilius Balbus presents the Stoic position, and Cotta presents the Academic Skeptic position. Cicero does not participate directly in the debate, but at the end he takes the position that he thinks the Stoic argument is the best. This is despite the fact that Cicero generally considers himself to be of the same school as Cotta. Velleius maintains the Epicurean position throughout, but mentions at the end that as between the Academic Skeptic arguments with the Stoics, he considers the Academic Skeptic side closer to his own.
Book One - Velleis presents the Epicurean Argument, And Cotta Responds for the Academic Skeptics Introduction by Cicero, with discussion of the reason for writing this and the importance of the subject. Cotta asks Velleius to present his views first. Cicero remarks that Velleius sounds confident, in typical Epicurean fashion, as if he had just come down from the presence of the gods in the intermundia. Velleius presents the Epicurean argument against other schools There is no sensory evidence that supports the tales of the supernatural gods told by other schools. “For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modeled and built by God? The other schools can give no explanation of how the universe was created. “What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the architect? From whence arose those five forms, of which the rest were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? The arguments that the other schools make on this point are mere wishful thinking. A created world cannot eternal. “But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end?” The Stoic and Aristotelian “First Cause” does not answer the problem of how the universe was created. If you allege like Aristotle or the Stoics that there was some original first cause, rather than a supernatural god like Plato asserts, how did this “first cause” create the universe we see, and why is the world mortal, as we see it to be, rather than immortal like Plato's god is asserted to have made it? If the Stoic Providence is the same as Plato’s God, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God? It makes no sense to say that world-building gods woke up to make the universe, because what were they doing for an eternity of time before that? “But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long. It makes no sense to say that the gods created the universe for humans. Who benefited from the creation of the universe? If the wise, that's a very small number. If fools, why seek to benefit them? Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God for the sake of men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable than folly? Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn to think lightly of by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when they are come. A round ball hurtling through space cannot be a god. They who affirm the world to be an animated and intelligent being have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak more hereafter. At present I must express my surprise at the weakness of those who endeavor to make it out to be not only animated and immortal, but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the most beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round Deity? Truly it is a being whirled about with a celerity to which nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion, the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why, therefore, should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the earth itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We see vast tracts of land barren and uninhabitable; some, because they are scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they are bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the sun is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are parts of the world, some of the Deity’s limbs must be said to be scorched, and some frozen. Book Two - Balbus presents the Stoic views of the gods. Book Three - Cotta responds with criticism of the Stoic view.
1.2. “On Divination”
1.3. “On Fate”
1.4. “On Ends”
1.5. “On Duties”
1.6. “Academic Questions”
1.7. “Tusculun Disputations”