====== The Norm Is Pleasure Too ====== Quote from "Epicurus And His Philosophy" page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added) "The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. __The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.__ I am going to use the same analysis to make sense of [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/28-pd18/|PD18]], [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/29-pd19/|PD19]], and [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/30-pd20/|PD20]]: Based on: - **__Epicurus [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/14-pd03/|PD03]]__** : "//The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. __Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once__// ." - __**Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus**__ : "//By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul."// - **__Diogenes Laertius X-34__** : "//The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined."// - __**On Ends Book One, 30**__ : "//Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. __Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain__?// - **__On Ends Book One, 38__** : //Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. __Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain__. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.////"// - **__On Ends Book One, 39__** : //For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. __For it would not wish for it for this reason, __ ////__inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure__.// - **__On Ends Book One, 56__** :// By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. __We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain__. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.// - **__On Ends Book One, 62__ **//: But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. __Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains__. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. __And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.__ // - __**On Ends Book Two, 9**__ : Cicero: "…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be." - __**On Ends, Book Two, 11: **__ Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" Torquatus: "Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be." (Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Cic. Fin. 2.11) - **__On Ends Book Two, 16__** : //"This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? __No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too__. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"// - __**Epicurus to Idomeneus, Diogenes Laertius:**__ //On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you.__ My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them; but I set above them all the gladness of mind at the memory of our past conversations__. But I would have you, as becomes your lifelong attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.// - __**Lucretius Book 3 line 98:**__// "//Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart." - **[[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/3488-episode-201-the-epicurean-arguments-in-cicero-s-on-ends-book-two-part-09/?postID=27349#post27349|Aulus Gellius]], [[https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Gellius/2*.html#note27|Attic Nights]]** : Gellius shows us a list of examples where highly reputable Greek writers were using the negation of a term as the extreme point of its opposite, a__nd he includes within the list Epicurus' use of "absence of pain._ckgedit_QUOT___ - 9 But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari). And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb: Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose. 10 But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. 11 It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example: "And not unwillingly they charged," and again:15 "Not then would you divine Atrides see Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight." 12 Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words:16 "The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains." 13 Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool "unlovely."14 For just as he expressed abhorrence of the "unpraised" man by the denial of praise, 15 so he abhorred the "unlovable" by the denial of love. 16 Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means "to name" and "cite." Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. 17 Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as p141 the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; 18 as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus.18 Here are cites that indicate that Epicurus was thinking that while his assertion that "pleasure" = "absence of pain," it is necessary to be able to reason this question out: [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/28-pd18/|PD18]]. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and __the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding__ of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind. [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/29-pd19/|PD19]]. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, __if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.__ U68 - **Plutarch, //That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible//, 4, p. 1089D:** It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the “painlessness” and the “stable condition of the flesh,” supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the “stable and settled condition of the flesh,” and the “trustworthy expectation” of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight __for men who are able to reflect. __Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this “pleasure” or “painlessness” or “stable condition” of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body. DeWitt Cite Page 233 - "The stable condition of well·being in the flesh and the confident hope of its continuance means the most exquisite and infallible of joys for those who are capable of figuring the problem out." Same list with brief commentary: - That [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/14-pd03/|PD03]] states: "//The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once//." - Diogenes Laertius X-34 - "//The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined."// - That Torquatus tells us [O.E. Book One, 30] that Epicurus held that "//Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. __Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain__?// - That Torquatus tells us [O.E. Book One, 38]: //Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.////"// - That Chrysippus' hand illustration is absolutely clear that the normal state of a hand is in pleasure, and in fact if the hand is totally without pain it is in the highest state of pleasure. [O.E. Book One, 39]//For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, ////inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.// - That the comparison of the host pouring wine and the guest drinking it being in the same state of pleasure, which is clearly implied in the example, seems based on the same flat consideration that if someone (host or guest or anyone else doing anything else) is free from pain, then they are in the same state of maximum pleasure. [O.E. Book 2, V-16]: //"This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"// Applying those to 18, 19, and 20…..
Quote [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/28-pd18/|PD18]]. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind. [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/29-pd19/|PD19]]. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure. [[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/30-pd20/|PD20]]. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.
We can deduce that these observations are based on the same principal that Torquatus is explaining. If there are only two experiences, pleasure and pain, then by necessity any experience which is not painful is pleasurable. All you need to know to determine the "height of pleasure" is to realize that by definition it is the result of any combination of experiences in life of which none of them are painful. By necessity of analysis and logical deduction "pleasure" can not be further improved if it is pure pleasure. This analysis also applies to time. The circumstance of whether a person lives one year or at thousand years adds nothing to the analysis. The height of pleasure is the same whether a person is male or female, young or old, Greek or barbarian, noble or commoner, or whatever other qualifiers you would like to add. This analysis applies no matter what "What about?" questions you through at it. What about sex? What about drugs? What about rock'n'roll? What about world peace? What about meaningfulness? What about virtue? What about nobility? What about Wisdom. Each and every one comes under the same analysis. Each of those is valuable only so far as it brings pleasure, and each and every one of those should be spit upon if they do not bring pleasure. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure in the sense of "better" pleasure" than finite time, it just contains "more in terms of variation, but the limit of pleasure is not extended. The flesh does not understand this, and never will without a correct philosophy explaining this situation, but the mind can understand it, can enjoy the understanding, and can know that whenever the end comes it has not fallen short of the experience of the best life possible. A reasoned understanding of the situation reveals that the height of pleasure is always the absence of pain, and that standard always applies and trumps every other consideration over every time period. Of course you want to experience more pleasure over time if that time is available to you, but no matter how long you have the 'limit of pleasure" is not increased. You can vary the pleasures if you have more time, but the perspective never changes. You can never do better than "zero pain," and this perspective is understandable by the wise. As we discussed in the episode, there are many people who - like Cicero - are not going to accept this analysis. Such people insist on a narrow definition of pleasure as including only stimulations of the body or mind, and those are not always available for most people. For example here in book one Cicero rejects the idea that the older Torquati received mental pleasures from their actions: - It is possible, indeed, that I may be mistaken; but my opinion is decided that that Torquatus, who first acquired that name, did not tear the chain from off his enemy for the purpose of procuring any corporeal pleasure to himself; and that he did not, in his third consulship, fight with the Latins at the foot of Mount Vesuvius for the sake of any personal pleasure. And when he caused his son to be executed, he appears to have even deprived himself of many pleasures, by thus preferring the claims of his dignity and command to nature herself and the dictates of fatherly affection. What need I say more? And Cicer goes so far as to say that Epicurus never defended his philosophy based on study and pursuit of mental pleasures, but this is simply false, even if we cited nothing more than Epicurus' last letter writing about the pleasant memories of associations with his friends and the pleasure he got from the study of nature: - What pleasure do you, O Torquatus, what pleasure does this Triarius derive from literature, and history, and the knowledge of events, and the reading of poets, and his wonderful recollection of such numbers of verses? And do not say to me, Why all these things are a pleasure to me. So, too, were those noble actions to the Torquati. [pg 106] Epicurus never asserts this in this manner; nor would you, O Triarius, nor any man who had any wisdom, or who had ever imbibed those principles. If you accept Epicurus' explanation, that the normal experience of being alive is pleasurable at all times unless you are in pain, then you can take advantage of stimulations when they are available and take advantage of the mental pleasures of understanding (including taking pleasure in the pains you are not suffering like the shipwreck analogy in Book 2). Thus there is never a time when the wise person cannot experience a predominance of pleasure over pain, just as Epicurus was doing just before he died. It seems to me to be very helpful to keep remembering that if you object to this analysi that the normal state of life is pleasure, then what you are doing is buying into the argument of Cicero and the non-Epicurean philosophers that indeed pleasure is limited to "sex, drugs, and rock'n roll." At this point I think I would also suggest that unless the normal state of life is identified as pleasurable, just as Norman DeWitt describes on page 240 of his book, it's pretty much impossible - or at least extremely hard - to make practical sense of Epicurean ethics. ---- ===== Pleasure As Any Non-Painful Experience ===== //Quisquis enim sentit quemadmodum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. //Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. - //Torquatus in Cicero, On Ends, Book One XI:38 (Reid)// ==== Basic References From Outside "On Ends" ==== - **[[https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/entry/14-pd03/|PD03]]****.** The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once. - **Diogenes Laertius ** (Bailey) [34] "Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view. The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth." ==== References From "On Ends" ==== - [VII]**Cicero's allegation that Epicureans do not value mental pleasure** shows that he is trying to pigeonhole pleasure as active stimulations and trying to exclude the standard pleasure of living (bodily or mentally) without pain. ["What pleasure do you, Torquatus, or what does our friend Triarius here derive from literature, from records and the investigation of historical facts, from conning the poets, from learning by heart so laboriously so many lines? And do not say to me “Why, these very actions bring me pleasure, as theirs did to the Torquati” Never indeed did Epicurus or Metrodorus or any one possessed of any wisdom or any knowledge of the tenets of your school ever maintain such a position by such arguments. And when the question is asked, as it often is, why Epicureans are so numerous, I answer that there are no doubt other motives, but the motive which especially fascinates the crowd is this; they believe their chief to declare that all upright and honourable actions are in themselves productive of delight, or rather pleasure."] - **The Proof That Pleasure Is The Good**: IX. "Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. __Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?__ - **Anyone Conscious must be in either a state of pleasure or pain.** XI. But let what has been said on this occasion suffice concerning the brilliant and famous actions of illustrious men. We shall indeed find a fitting opportunity by and by for discoursing about the tendency of all the virtues towards pleasure. At present however I shall shew what is the essence and what are the characteristics of pleasure, so as to remove all confusion caused by ignorant people, and to make it clear how serious, how sober, how austere is that school which is esteemed to be pleasure-seeking, luxurious and effeminate. For the pleasure which we pursue is not that alone which excites the natural constitution itself by a kind of sweetness, and of which the sensual enjoyment is attended by a kind of agreeableness, but we look upon the greatest pleasure as that which is enjoyed when all pain is removed. Now inasmuch as whenever we are released from pain, we rejoice in the mere emancipation and freedom from all annoyance, and everything whereat we rejoice is equivalent to pleasure, just as everything whereat we are troubled is equivalent to pain, therefore the complete release from pain is rightly termed pleasure. For just as the mere removal of annoyance brings with it the realization of pleasure, whenever hunger and thirst have been banished by food and drink, so in every case the banishment of pain ensures its replacement by pleasure. Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. __Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.__ - [39]** Chryssipus' Hand - **"And even at Athens, as I have heard my father say, when he was jesting in a good-humoured and facetious way upon the Stoics, there is a statue in the Ceramicus of Chrysippus, sitting down with his hand stretched out; and this attitude [pg 112] of the hand intimates that he is amusing himself with this brief question, “Does your hand, while in that condition in which it is at present, want anything?”—Nothing at all. But if pleasure were a good, would it want it? I suppose so. Pleasure, then, is not a good. And my father used to say that even a statue would not say this if it could speak. For the conclusion was drawn as against the Stoics with sufficient acuteness, but it did not concern Epicurus. For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, __inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.__ XII. But that pleasure is the boundary of all good things may be easily seen from this consideration." - [56] **Corollaries:** By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. __We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain__. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy. - Torquatus affirming that when pain is absent that is fullest pleasure. - Torquatus being asked if host is in same state of pleasure a guest.