Differences
This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.
| Both sides previous revisionPrevious revision | |||
| why_ataraxia_is_not_the_goal [2025/04/07 08:58] – [3. Reading the philosophy as a whole there are overwhelming numbers of references identifying "Pleasure" (rather than "Tranquility") as the Goal / Ultimate Good of life.] cassiusamicus | why_ataraxia_is_not_the_goal [2025/04/07 08:59] (current) – cassiusamicus | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Line 10: | Line 10: | ||
| - **Cicero:: On Ends Book One** "Nor indeed can our mind find any other ground whereon to take its stand as though already at the goal; and all its fears and sorrows are comprised under the term pain, nor is there any other thing besides which is able merely by its own character to cause us vexation or pangs In addition to this the germs of desire and aversion and generally of action originate either in pleasure or in pain." [42] This being so, it is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live agreeably." | - **Cicero:: On Ends Book One** "Nor indeed can our mind find any other ground whereon to take its stand as though already at the goal; and all its fears and sorrows are comprised under the term pain, nor is there any other thing besides which is able merely by its own character to cause us vexation or pangs In addition to this the germs of desire and aversion and generally of action originate either in pleasure or in pain." [42] This being so, it is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live agreeably." | ||
| - **Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32:** "I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness? | - **Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32:** "I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness? | ||
| - | |||
| - | |||
| ===== 2. Epicurus never states that " | ===== 2. Epicurus never states that " | ||
| Line 24: | Line 22: | ||
| - **Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus**: "They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures." | - **Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus**: "They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures." | ||
| - **Lucretius On The Nature of Things**: Book 2 Line 1 "O miserable minds of men! O blinded breasts! In what darkness of life and in how great dangers is passed this term of life whatever its duration! Not choose to see that nature craves for herself no more than this, that pain hold aloof from the body, and she in mind enjoy a feeling of __pleasure__ | - **Lucretius On The Nature of Things**: Book 2 Line 1 "O miserable minds of men! O blinded breasts! In what darkness of life and in how great dangers is passed this term of life whatever its duration! Not choose to see that nature craves for herself no more than this, that pain hold aloof from the body, and she in mind enjoy a feeling of __pleasure__ | ||
| - | |||
| - | |||
| ===== 4. Epicurus never identified any pleasure as intrinsically " | ===== 4. Epicurus never identified any pleasure as intrinsically " | ||