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-====== The Epicurean Goal is "Pleasure" and not "Ataraxia." ======+====== The Epicurean Goal is "Pleasure" - not "Ataraxia." ======
  
 Questions frequently arise as to the role of "Tranquility" in Epicurean philosophy, and whether in the form of "Ataraxia" or "Aponia" Epicurus was advocating these terms as either some special and highest form of pleasure, or something higher than pleasure itself, to be pursued as the ultimate goal of life. Questions frequently arise as to the role of "Tranquility" in Epicurean philosophy, and whether in the form of "Ataraxia" or "Aponia" Epicurus was advocating these terms as either some special and highest form of pleasure, or something higher than pleasure itself, to be pursued as the ultimate goal of life.
  
-Difficulties arise in defining what these terms mean, how Epicurus was referring to them, and where they stand in relation to "Pleasure" - the term that Epicurus generally employs in describing the guide or goal of life. While there is no doubt that tranquility and concepts such as "Absence of pain" and "absence of disturbance" are important aspects of the best life, it is important to be clear on how these terms relate to each other so that the primary focus remains on "Pleasure" and how best to obtain it.+Difficulties arise in defining what these terms mean, how Epicurus was referring to them, and where they stand in relation to "Pleasure" - the term that Epicurus generally employs in describing the guide or goal of life. While there is no doubt that tranquility and concepts such as "Absence of pain" and "absence of disturbance" are important aspects of the best life, the Epicureans made clear that their primary focus was on "Pleasure" and how best to obtain it.
  
-===== 1. Philosophically speaking there can be only one ultimate goal, and Epicurus finds that in "Pleasure" rather than "Tranquility." or "Absence of Pain" or "Absence of Disturbance  =====+===== 1. Philosophically speaking there can be only one ultimate goal, and Epicurus finds that in "Pleasure" rather than "Tranquility," or "Absence of Pain," or "Absence of Disturbance." =====
  
   - **Cicero: On Ends Book One - [29] IX.**  "‘First, then,’ said he, ‘I shall plead my case on the lines laid down by the founder of our school himself: I shall define the essence and features of the problem before us, not because I imagine you to be unacquainted with them, but with a view to the methodical progress of my speech. The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations. [30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"   - **Cicero: On Ends Book One - [29] IX.**  "‘First, then,’ said he, ‘I shall plead my case on the lines laid down by the founder of our school himself: I shall define the essence and features of the problem before us, not because I imagine you to be unacquainted with them, but with a view to the methodical progress of my speech. The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations. [30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"
   - **Cicero:: On Ends Book One**  "Nor indeed can our mind find any other ground whereon to take its stand as though already at the goal; and all its fears and sorrows are comprised under the term pain, nor is there any other thing besides which is able merely by its own character to cause us vexation or pangs In addition to this the germs of desire and aversion and generally of action originate either in pleasure or in pain." [42] This being so, it is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live agreeably."   - **Cicero:: On Ends Book One**  "Nor indeed can our mind find any other ground whereon to take its stand as though already at the goal; and all its fears and sorrows are comprised under the term pain, nor is there any other thing besides which is able merely by its own character to cause us vexation or pangs In addition to this the germs of desire and aversion and generally of action originate either in pleasure or in pain." [42] This being so, it is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live agreeably."
   - **Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32:**  "I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point."   - **Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fragment 32:**  "I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now. If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point."
-===== 2. Epicurus never states that "Pleasure" and "Tranquility" are the same thing.  =====+===== 2. Epicurus never states that "Pleasure" and "Tranquility" are the same thing. =====
  
   - Common understanding of the terms indicates that "Pleasure" is the wider term: all Tranquility is Pleasure, but all Pleasure is not Tranquility. Epicurus nowhere in any text states that Tranquility is not a pleasure or that Tranquility is something superior to Pleasure. There are no cites under this point because such cites (to "Tranquility" having exactly the same meaning as "Pleasure" or being something other than a type of pleasure) do not exist. The instance used primarily to argue this from the letter to Menoeceus is a small part of a much larger discussion in which the intent is not to identify the two as equal but to explain how to pursue pleasure without encountering pains worse than those pleasures." ("When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. [132] It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.")   - Common understanding of the terms indicates that "Pleasure" is the wider term: all Tranquility is Pleasure, but all Pleasure is not Tranquility. Epicurus nowhere in any text states that Tranquility is not a pleasure or that Tranquility is something superior to Pleasure. There are no cites under this point because such cites (to "Tranquility" having exactly the same meaning as "Pleasure" or being something other than a type of pleasure) do not exist. The instance used primarily to argue this from the letter to Menoeceus is a small part of a much larger discussion in which the intent is not to identify the two as equal but to explain how to pursue pleasure without encountering pains worse than those pleasures." ("When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. [132] It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.")
   - **Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus**: Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '   - **Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus**: Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '
   - **Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus**: A further difference from the Cyrenaics: they thought that bodily pains were worse than those of the soul, and pointed out that offenses are visited by bodily punishment. But Epicurus held that the pains of the soul are worse, for the flesh is only troubled for the moment, but the soul for past, present, and future. In the same way the pleasures of the soul are greater. As proof that pleasure is the end, he points out that all living creatures as soon as they are born take delight in pleasure, but resist pain by a natural impulse apart from reason. Therefore we avoid pain by instinct, just as Heracles, when he is being devoured by the shirt of Nessus, cries aloud, With tears and groans: the rocks re-echoed far from Locris' mountain peaks, Euboea’s hills."   - **Diogenes Laertius, Biography of Epicurus**: A further difference from the Cyrenaics: they thought that bodily pains were worse than those of the soul, and pointed out that offenses are visited by bodily punishment. But Epicurus held that the pains of the soul are worse, for the flesh is only troubled for the moment, but the soul for past, present, and future. In the same way the pleasures of the soul are greater. As proof that pleasure is the end, he points out that all living creatures as soon as they are born take delight in pleasure, but resist pain by a natural impulse apart from reason. Therefore we avoid pain by instinct, just as Heracles, when he is being devoured by the shirt of Nessus, cries aloud, With tears and groans: the rocks re-echoed far from Locris' mountain peaks, Euboea’s hills."
-===== 3. Reading the philosophy as a whole there are overwhelming numbers of references identifying "Pleasure" (rather than "Tranquility") as the Goal / Ultimate Good of life.  =====+===== 3. Reading the philosophy as a whole there are overwhelming numbers of references identifying "Pleasure" (rather than "Tranquility") as the Goal / Ultimate Good of life. =====
  
   - **Letter to Menoeceus**: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."   - **Letter to Menoeceus**: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."
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   - **Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus**: " They say that he wrote to many other women of pleasure and particularly to Leontion, with whom Metrodorus was also in love; and that in the treatise On the End of Life he wrote, ‘I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste and withdraw the pleasures of love and those of hearing and sight.’   - **Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus**: " They say that he wrote to many other women of pleasure and particularly to Leontion, with whom Metrodorus was also in love; and that in the treatise On the End of Life he wrote, ‘I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste and withdraw the pleasures of love and those of hearing and sight.’
   - **Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus**: "They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures."   - **Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus**: "They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures."
-===== 4. Epicurus never identified any pleasure as intrinsically "better" than another pleasure.  =====+  - **Lucretius On The Nature of Things**: Book 2 Line 1 "O miserable minds of men! O blinded breasts! In what darkness of life and in how great dangers is passed this term of life whatever its duration! Not choose to see that nature craves for herself no more than this, that pain hold aloof from the body, and she in mind enjoy a feeling of __pleasure__  exempt from care and fear? 
 +===== 4. Epicurus never identified any pleasure as intrinsically "better" than another pleasure. =====
  
   - There is no hierarchy of pleasures in Epicurean philosophy which would justify identifying any single type of pleasure as a "best" pleasure. Therefore it would have made no sense for him to say that Tranquility or "Absence of Pain" or "Absence of Disturbance" are a "best" pleasure or "highest" pleasure.   - There is no hierarchy of pleasures in Epicurean philosophy which would justify identifying any single type of pleasure as a "best" pleasure. Therefore it would have made no sense for him to say that Tranquility or "Absence of Pain" or "Absence of Disturbance" are a "best" pleasure or "highest" pleasure.
   - Epicurus listed a number of pleasures "by which he was able to determine the good" but he did not list "Tranquility" among them, nor did he rank his list in order of importance. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.6: "It is observed too that in his treatise On the End-Goal, he writes in these terms: “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”   - Epicurus listed a number of pleasures "by which he was able to determine the good" but he did not list "Tranquility" among them, nor did he rank his list in order of importance. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.6: "It is observed too that in his treatise On the End-Goal, he writes in these terms: “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”
  
-===== 5. Although Epicurus had no reason to identify a "best" or "highest" type of pleasure, Epicurus had a very strong reason for discussing and identifying a "LIMIT of pleasure."  =====+===== 5. Although Epicurus had no reason to identify a "best" or "highest" type of pleasure, Epicurus had a very strong reason for discussing and identifying a "limit" of pleasure. =====
  
   - A "best" Pleasure has no necessary connection with a "limit of pleasure" but it is the desire to equate these terms that generates confusion, such as Cicero employed in arguing that "absence of pain" is not the way normal people discuss pleasure."   - A "best" Pleasure has no necessary connection with a "limit of pleasure" but it is the desire to equate these terms that generates confusion, such as Cicero employed in arguing that "absence of pain" is not the way normal people discuss pleasure."
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   - Epicurus explicitly and near the top of his principle doctrines identified not a "best" pleasure but a "Limit of Quantity" of pleasure: "PD03. **The limit of quantity in pleasures**  is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once." If Epicurus had wished to say that "Absence of pain is the very best pleasure and is the ultimate goal of life" he could clearly have done so, but he did not.   - Epicurus explicitly and near the top of his principle doctrines identified not a "best" pleasure but a "Limit of Quantity" of pleasure: "PD03. **The limit of quantity in pleasures**  is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once." If Epicurus had wished to say that "Absence of pain is the very best pleasure and is the ultimate goal of life" he could clearly have done so, but he did not.
  
-===== 6. Numerous Other Ancient Texts Make Clear That Epicurus Held "Pleasure" as the term to use to describe the ultimate goal of life:  =====+===== 6. Numerous Other Ancient Texts Make Clear That Epicurus Held "Pleasure" as the term to use to describe the ultimate goal of life: =====
  
   - **Cicero, In Defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23**: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.” Note: Here is a link to Perseus where the Latin and translation of this can be compared. The Latin is: “nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita, plena et conferta voluptatibus.” See also here for word translations.   - **Cicero, In Defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23**: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.” Note: Here is a link to Perseus where the Latin and translation of this can be compared. The Latin is: “nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita, plena et conferta voluptatibus.” See also here for word translations.
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   - **Lactantius, Divine Institutes, III.7.7**: "Epicurus thinks that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind. Aristippus holds that it is in the pleasure of the body."   - **Lactantius, Divine Institutes, III.7.7**: "Epicurus thinks that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind. Aristippus holds that it is in the pleasure of the body."
   - **Lactantius, Divine Institutes, III.17.38**: [Epicurus says, in effect:] “Let us serve pleasure, then, in whatever way we can, for in a short time we will be nothing whatsoever. Let us suffer no day, therefore, no point of time to flow by for us without pleasure, lest, since we ourselves are at sometime to perish, the very fact that we live may perish.” Although he does not say this in so many words, however, he teaches this is fact."   - **Lactantius, Divine Institutes, III.17.38**: [Epicurus says, in effect:] “Let us serve pleasure, then, in whatever way we can, for in a short time we will be nothing whatsoever. Let us suffer no day, therefore, no point of time to flow by for us without pleasure, lest, since we ourselves are at sometime to perish, the very fact that we live may perish.” Although he does not say this in so many words, however, he teaches this is fact."
-  - **Porphyry, On Abstinence, I.53**: Epicurus rightly surmised that we should beware of food which we want to enjoy and which we pursue, but find disagreeable once we get it. All rich, heavy food is like this, and when people are carried away by wanting it, they land in expense, illness, glut, or worry. For this reason we should guard against excess even of simple things, and in all cases we must examine what happens as a result of enjoyment or possession, how big a thing it is, and whether it relieves any trouble of body or soul. Otherwise, in every case, tension, such as life engenders, will arise from gratification. We must not go beyond the bounds, but keep within the boundary and measure that applies to such things. 
   - **Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 2 p. 465F (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 29.79)**: For this reason not even Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.   - **Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 2 p. 465F (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 29.79)**: For this reason not even Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.